Abstract-Fault injection (FI) has been shown to be an effective approach to assessing the dependability of software systems. To determine the impact of faults injected during FI, a given oracle is needed. Oracles can take a variety of forms, including (i) specifications, (ii) error detection mechanisms and (iii) golden runs. Focusing on golden runs, in this paper we show that there are classes of software which a golden run based approach can not be used to analyse. Specifically, we demonstrate that a golden run based approach can not be used in the analysis of systems which employ a main control loop with an irregular period. Further, we show how a simple model, which has been refined using FI experiments, can be employed as an oracle in the analysis of such a system.
I. INTRODUCTION
As computer systems become pervasive the functionality of systems will increasingly be defined by software, thus making software dependability a critical issue for systems developers. Fault injection (FI) is one approach that can be used to assess the dependability of a software system. In general, FI involves analysing the response of a system to the artificial insertion of faults or errors, usually with a view to assessing the coverage and latency of error detection and correction mechanisms. FI techniques can be grouped into three, not necessarily distinct, categories; simulation based fault injection, physical fault injection and software implemented fault injection (SWIFI) [1] [3] [9] [10] [11] . To assess the impact of an injected fault, an oracle is needed. There are various types of oracle that can be employed, including (i) specification-based [5] , (ii) error detection mechanisms [12] , and (iii) golden runs [4] .
It is often the case that either software systems are not equipped with error detection mechanisms or the mechanisms themselves may not be correct [8] . Further, it is also the case that the availability of a complete formal specification cannot be guaranteed. In such situations a golden run based approach can be used to capture the correct functioning of a software system. In this approach the system is run under normal conditions for a set of test cases. For each test case, the system is executed and the run is termed as the golden run for that test case. The golden run then acts as a reproducible reference run of the system for that test case, capturing information about the system state during execution. Then, for the same set of test cases, the system is executed under various fault injections. For each test case the golden run and fault-injected run are compared, where the golden run is used as an oracle, i.e. the impact of faults is determined based upon deviations from the golden run.
Despite the appeal of the described approach, there are situations where it can be difficult to perform an analysis based upon a golden run. For example, it is often suggested that in order to analyse software using a golden run based approach, the software system should be deterministic in all single executions [13] . However, there are classes of software, including concurrent systems, that will exhibit nondeterministic behaviour. Thus, the desire for determinism could impact upon the applicability of fault injection to such systems. To address this limitation we propose a variant of the golden based approach which allows a specific class of non-deterministic software to be analysed. Specifically, we show that a class of sequential, non-deterministic software, such as those with an irregular main control loop or an unstable initialisation due to environmental fluctuations, can be analysed using a variant of golden run based FI.
To perform the described analysis we construct a simple reference run model derived from data collected over a significant number of normal executions. We then refine this reference run model through fault injection experiments using PROPANE [6] . In evaluating our approach we focus upon improvements in the number of failed executions which the reference run model correctly classifies as erroneous.
In this paper we make the following specific contributions:
• We demonstrate the limitations of employing a golden run based approach when performing fault injection analysis upon sequential software systems which exhibit non-deterministic behaviour • We develop approaches whereby SWIFI analysis techniques can be applied to sequential software systems which exhibit non-deterministic behaviour • We evaluate our approach to constructing reference run models that can detect errors resulting in failure For brevity some detail has been omitted from this paper. The interested reader is directed to the associated technical report for a thorough treatment of the issues discussed [7] .
II. MODELS A. System Model
In this paper we adopt a grey-box view of the target system. Specifically, we view the target system as being a series of inter-connected subsystems, each being composed of a collection of grey-box modules. These modules are considered to be composed of a collection of functions. With respect to subsystems the grey-box system view means that, whilst the inputs and outputs of subsystems can be observed, no assumptions about the interconnections between subsystems are made. With respect to modules the grey-box view mean that, whilst access to application source code is afforded, the precise functionality of each module need not be known.
B. Fault Model
The fault model adopted in this paper is a transient fault model, i.e. a fault occurs and may never appear again. This fault model implies that single bit-flips faults are used to target variables within the selected system modules, allowing transient failures to be mimicked. We do not discriminate among variables and assume that all variables stored in local memory are equally susceptible to corruption.
III. TARGET SYSTEM
The FlightGear Flight Simulator is an open-source project which seeks to build an extensible yet highly sophisticated multi-platform flight simulator [2] . The simulator is written in C/C++ and configured using XML files.
The simulator architecture depends upon a single main control loop, which periodically sends update requests to software subsystems. The simulator is a single-threaded application, thus program control is passed to each individual subsystems in turn, with the main control loop being held up whilst each request is serviced. As a consequence of this architecture, a single rendering request is sent to the renderer subsystem at every iteration of the main control loop, meaning that the frequency at which the loop iterates is directly linked to the framerate. This, combined with the fact that framerate is a function of scene complexity, results in the main control loop having an irregular period and thus exhibiting non-deterministic behaviour.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
An aircraft takeoff procedure lasting 1400 iteration of the main control loop was used as a test case in all experiments. A simple input module was developed to provide an input vector at each iteration of the main control loop. To ensure that the irregular period of the main control loop did not nullify the relevance of the input vector, the simulator configuration files were modified to allow the same input vector to be provided at each iteration. System outputs, current altitude and speed, were recorded at each iteration of the main control loop. Henceforth the current altitude and speed outputs are referred to as observed outputs. Instrumentation details for the FI experiments used in model refinement are shown in Table 1 . All experiments focused upon modules within the Flight Dynamics subsystem. Instrumented variables were selected at random from those used the execution of the test case. Each experiment, i.e. each randomly chosen bit flip, was repeated 7 times.
V. MODEL CONSTRUCTION AND RESULTS

A. Golden Run
An attempt was made to perform a golden run based analysis upon the target system. A single execution of the target system was performed, with the observed outputs being recorded at each main control loop iteration. During fault injection experiments it was observed that all executions were classified as erroneous. An attempt was made to recreate the golden run. This recreation proved unsuccessful, with each iteration yielding inconsistent values for observed outputs. A further 150 executions were performed, with no two of these executions yielding consistent values. It was determined that employing a golden run based approach in the analysis of the target system was inappropriate. As the target system has no formal specification or documentation, an alternative approach to deriving an oracle was motivated.
B. Range Model
In this section we propose, refine and validate a range model which classifies executions as being either erroneous or valid based upon the values of observed system outputs.
The use of tolerances in golden run comparisons is motivated by the need to account for deviations in the runtime values of variables. The range model admits deviation by assuming that each observed output has an associated range of valid values for each iteration of the main control loop and that any occurrence outside this range is indicative of an erroneous execution. As it can not be guaranteed that a true maximum or minimum has been observed for any iteration of the main control loop, the range model must account for deviations which cause observed outputs to violate previously observed bounds. We achieve this by extending the upper and lower bound of the range by a percentage of observed maximum and minimum respectively. Table 2 shows the result of fault injections experiments classified using the range model, with the range deviation percentage set to 10% above and below the previously observed minimum and maximum respectively. The number of executions performed is given in the Runs column. The Error Rate column expresses the number of erroneous executions as a proportion of the total number of executions, where an execution is classified as erroneous if any observed output value strays outside the valid range for at least one iteration of the main control loop. The Failure Rate column expresses the number of executions which could not be completed due to failure as a proportion of the total number of executions. Lastly, Detection Rate details the proportion of failed executions classified as erroneous before failing. The average detection rate of 0.750 is low enough to prevent this parameterisation of the range model from being used as an oracle in dependability analysis. Although it is not well represented in Table 2 , it is interesting to note that the repeated execution of an experiment may not yield the same classification, due to the fact that variations in observed outputs can determine whether a fault manifests as a error and whether the overall range is violated by an execution. To ensure that the model was able to discriminate between valid and erroneous executions, 150 executions with no fault injections were performed. The model correctly classified each of these executions as non-erroneous.
We now show how adjusting the bounds of the range model impacts upon the capacity of the model to detect errors resulting in failure. Specifically, we show how narrowing the valid range can increase the failure detection rate without unduly impacting upon the error rate.
The results in Table 3 show an improvement in the detection of errors which result in failures. A total of 14 executions were newly classified as erroneous. These 14 executions were associated with only 2 experiments, with each of the 7 separate executions of each experiment being correctly classified as erroneous. Note that the selected range percentage deviation was not chosen blindly. The value was reached by systematically narrowing the extent of the valid range and observing the response of the model. It was observed that executions resulting in failures were first to be excluded as the range narrowed, indicating that repetitions of the same fault injected execution produce similar values in at least one of the observed system outputs. A range deviation of 7.8% was found to be the last point at which a failure was encountered before the range narrowing process began to reclassify executions which did not result in failure. The improvement presented gives credence to the assumption that there is a valid range of values associated with each of the observed outputs and may also suggest that certain observed output values are associated with failures. To verify that the improvement had not impacted the capacity of the model to discriminate failures, 150 executions with no fault injections were performed. The refined model was able to correctly classify each of these executions.
C. Clustered Model
The clustered model is an extension of the range model that is intended to detect errors that lead to with failure within the valid range of observed output values. A limitation of the range model is the assumption that an error-free execution could produce values across the entire valid range, thus ignoring groupings or arbitrary values occurring within the range. We address this by identifying values within the range that are grouped sufficiently closely to suggest that they may combine to form a valid sub-range. The range deviation percentage used in the range model is retained. A sub-range deviation percentage is used to govern how close any two values must be in order to form part the same sub-range. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of fault injections experiments classified using the clustered model with both deviation parameters set to 10% and 7.8% respectively.
The results presented demonstrate the superiority of the clustered model, with both parameterisations yielding better detection rates than their range model counterparts. This improved detection rate does not lead to an unnecessary increase in the error rate, as only those executions newly classified as resulting in failures contribute to the increase. The matched range and sub-range deviation percentages shown were selected to allow a broad, yet imperfect, comparison with the results shown for the range model. To enhance the clustered model it is possible to use unmatched values for range and sub-range deviation. As it had been previously justified, the range deviation percentage was not modified. The sub-range deviation was established using the same systematic approach described for the range model.
The results in Table 6 show an improvement upon the refined range model. Not only is the failure detection rate superior to that achieved by any parameterisation of the range model, the clustered model also correctly classified all failures as erroneous in three of the four modules under test. To demonstrate that the clustered model can discriminate between valid and erroneous executions, 150 non-fault injected execution were classified. The refined clustered model was able to correctly classify each of these executions.
As the target system exhibits non-deterministic behaviour, it is possible that the improvements presented may only be relevant to the experiments conducted in the refinement of the model. For validation purposed a supplementary set of fault injection experiments were performed. The results in Table 7 suggest that the refined clustered model can indeed detect errors which result in failures under the assumed fault model, as both the error and detection rates are consistent with those previously obtained.
Having constructed, refined and validated reference run models that are capable of detecting errors which lead to failure, it is reasonable to suggest that these models demonstrate potential for use as oracles in FI analysis. Further, the information contained within the models can be used in the design of error detection mechanisms. For example, the identified valid ranged associated with the refined model could be used to inform the implementation of dynamic mechanisms such as runtime checks.
